Introduction
should not be thought of as having any mean ing in. the sense of "most" or "typical"; they are statements the user is prepared to accept as part of an explanation as to why some thing may be true. What, then, does a default mean? Within the default logic camp, we know of no work which provides a semantics for defaults, in the sense that an experiment is described that can be performed in the semantic do main to verify the truth of a default. It is therefore compelling to view defaults as qual itative probabilistic statements where nu meric distributions are unavailable. We sur vey some of these views but note most re quire numbers, something default reasoning intended to avoid, or have side effects.
Rather than "add semantics" to defaults, we construct a sound non-numeric proba bilistic formalism called an inference graph. We explore its mathematical properties, then apply it to the standard examples. We con clude with a brief description of the imple mentation.
Though default r�asoning involves reason-2 What's in a default? ing under conditions of uncertainty, some argue it is not probabilistic reasoning. Re-Poole et al [20] attempt to put both default iter and Crisculo [21] distinguish the two by reasoning and diagnosis under a single urn suggesting different interpretations for the brella by constructing a system containing a word "most" . Probabilistic reasoning gives set of facts F known to be true, a set � of "most" a statistical connotation, whereas de-defaults, and g, a set of (possible) observa fault logic gives it a prototypical sense. On tions which are goals to be proved. Here we the other hand, Poole (18] claims defaults assume F, �and g are propositional.
then D is an ezplanation of g. This system is based on a theorem prover and can be used in two ways. If g consists of observations known to be true, we interpret g as querying t»hy g?, and Dis a d iagnosis of g. If g is not known to be true, then g is interpreted as querying t»hether g?, and g is a prediction of FUD. The problem default logic runs into is that there _ is typically another D' such that FuD' predicts -.g; this is known as the mul tiple eztension problem and is discussed be low. (This is a very abbreviated presentation of default reasoning; for details on implemen tation and application see [15, 14) .)
AJJ pointed out in the introduction, de faults appear to have no semantics, and many researchers study the relationship be tween default reasoning and uncertainty. Rich [22) advocates adding certainty factors to poss ible hypotheses to fine-tune a default reasoning syst�m and concludes "default rea soning is likelihood reasoning and treating it that way simplifies it" . While some argue with her treatment, her conclusions seem to be widely held. Ginsberg [4] pursues this ap proach.
At the 1987 Workshop on Uncertainty in AI, Groaof suggested defaults are interval valued probabilities on the entire unit inter val. Default inference thus becomes closely related to Kyburg's theory of interval-valued probabilities [8, 7) .
In · [9] ; McCarthy states non-monotonic sentences can represent statements of in finitesimal probability, but does not go into detail. Pearl explores this in [12] . This inter pretation has some problems. Let e = emu, it follows p (elb) � 0. But since a prior is always bounded by its conditionals on any evidence and the negation of that evidence, we can show p(e) � 0.
Default logic also has this "property": from no knowledge at all, we can prove -.emu by cases from fly and -.fly using the contra positive forms C?f the defaults. This intro duces the following variant of the "lottery paradox" (8] . 
then p ( dl ozzie-animal) is close to one since the disjunction of the other three is close to zero. Default reasoning and circumscription (16] suffer the same problem. Poole [17, 3] solves this by explicitly pruning the proof tree with a set of sentences called constraints. However, to do this, you need to know the right answers in advance.
Besides making subclasses vanish, Pearl's £-semantics suffers another problem: in gen eral, it is impossible to go out into a real problem domain and find a set of conditional probabilities infinitely close to one.
Bacchus [1] address es this issue of practi cality and argues for thresholding, that is, that a possible hypothesis stands for a prob ability greater than some threshold k > 1/2. His system allows only a single defeasible in ference, since p ( bla) > k and p(c l b) > k do not in general constrain the value of p ( cia) to be greater thank.
There seems to be no end to different prob abilistic semantics that might be added to defaults or inference rules that might be in vented to come up with the right answers for 
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Inference graphs
An inference graph is a strictly probabilis tic formalism based on standard probabil ity theory, conditional independence and sen tences of confirmation.
Rather than give rules for accepting uncertain conclusions, the inference graph allows us to make inferences about shifts in belief.
Confirmation
An interesting mathematical property of log ical implication is that knowledge of the con sequent increases belief in the antecedent.
That is, a =* b implies that p(ajb) ;::: . p(a). Rosenkrantz (23) calls this property confir mation, and we will see it has many of the same useful computational properties as other probabilistic formalisms.
Confirmation describes a shift in belief; it seems to be the weakest probabilistic prop erty a default ought to have. This provides an interesting venue to explore: rather than use knowledge of the form "birds are more likely to fly than not" , we consider knowledge of the form "an individual is more likely to fly once we learn that it is a bird" . 
Semantics
Nodes in an inference graph denote events.
Generally events have two mutually exclu sive outcomes, for example fly or --.fly. Occa sionally an event may have several mutually exclusive outcomes, (not all of which need be specified), for example {hawk, dove}. (Note that we insist on strict inequality. This means that links such as 2 + 2 = 3 =* sky-is-blue cannot appear on an inference graph. For the same reason, we also insist all events are possible.)
The topology of the inference graph carries information about independence of events. If a is a node, and b1, ... , bn are the nodes directed into a, then a is conditionally inde pendent of all the predecessors of the b, given the outcomes of the bi.
Thus, an inference graph may be seen as a non-numeric influence diagram [25] . We next explore the kinds of inferences about confir mation that we can make. 4 The confirmation relation
, we also write conf{a,b).
Symmetry
Proof:
Follows immediately from Bayes' Rule. 0 This allows our system to be reversible; if we observe sneeze we can confirm has-cold. Alternately, if we know that someone has a cold we can predict they will sneeze. Thus we can use the same. formalism for prediction and diagnosis.
Negation
into difficulties when they apply the contra positive: they viola.te independence assump tions. Proof: p(cjab) = p(cja) > p(c), since sen tences of probability hold for logically equiv alent propositions. 0 Default reasoners produce separate argu ments for c and d and attempt to choose among the arguments by appeal to "speci ficity". Poole [19] calls it preferring the most specific theory and Kirby [6] calls it choosing the most specific extension.
While the default logic view see ms to be to prefer the conclusion based on the most specific knowledge, we remark that there is not universal agreement on this in the prob abilist community when statistics are not good. Kyburg [7, 8] suggests we make an inference based on the narrowest reference class for which we have adequate statistics. Some Bayesians suggest that data from var ious subclasses be combined [ Thus, not only does bird increase belief in fly, -.bird increases belief in -.fly. An inter esting intermediate result is that the "contra positive" form of a link yields a valid infer ence, so long as it is made from a single link. This means use of the contrapositive form of a link is valid, bu.t the context of such an inference must be carefully restricted. Infer ence graphs also explain why default reason ers based on a theorem prover sometime run 278 conf(b,a).
Proof:
This generalizes the property of logical links to the rest of the graph. 0
.Transitive inference
Default proofs consist of more than a single inference; part of the appeal of such reason ers is that they appear to create and argu ment by making inferences towards a goal. In general, if a -b and b -c are links on an in ference graph, we cannot conclude conj(c, a). However, if c is conditionally independent of a given b, it can be shown that conj(c, a). In Other inferences p(a). From the premises and an identity of 4. 5 probability it follows p (a l b) � p ( a l-., b) . Then,
The following two lemmas address situations p(a l b) = p(a l cb)p(c l b) + p(a l-., cb)p(-.,clb).
that prove to be useful in Section 5.3.
proofs are straightforward and we omit them. p a -.,b = p a c..., p c ...., +p a -,c..., p ..., c ...., • Simplify using the conditional independence LeiDDl a 4.10 If coni( ..., a, b), coni( a, c), and knowledge, then subtract to obtain b � c, then coni( a, -,be ) .
But then both terms must be positive, con tradicting the premise that conj(b, c). 0 Unsurprisingly, each such inference results in a dilution of confirmation. This lemma is needed for later results.
Lemma 4.11 If r and e are the direct pre decessors of g, and 1. r I= e, 2. a I= e, 3. r is unconditionally independent of a, 4. conj(g, e), 5. conj(-.g, r ) , Lemma 4.7 If conf{a,b} and conf{b,c) and a is conditionally independent of c given b, then conf(g, a).
then p(a l c) < p(a l b).
The next two lemmas yield two ways of confirming conjunctions of events. conf(a,c) and a is conditionally independent of b given c, then conf(a,bc).
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Examples
.1 Birds fly
This inference graph aims to capture a lot of information. If something is a bird, we believe it is more likely that it will fly, and if it flies, it is more likely to be airborn. Feathered things fty With Lemma 4.6, we can show conj{feathers, fly) using c = bird.
Modified Nixon Diamond
Below is the historic example of not want ing to draw an inference. H Dick is both a
Quaker and a Republican, we do not want to conclude he is a hawk or dove.
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Our system concludes that quaker in creases belief in dove and republican increases belief in hawk. Since the graph contains no information· about the joint distribution, we do not conclude either hawk or dove if Nixon is both.
However, we want to conclude Quak ers and Republicans are political.
In heritance systems cannot represent mutual exelusion(S]. Default reasoners simply add all the links with the result that political is .true given dove or -.dove [13] . It is possible to prove that an object about which nothing is known is a political non-emu! We solve the problem in this formalism by making hawk and dove mutually exclu sive but not necessarily exhaustive outcomes of some random event.
Since political is conditionally independent of quaker given dove, we can make the desired inference using Lemma 4.6. The price we pay for consistency and transitive inference is not being able to show that -.hawk is confirmed by quaker. H we allow this, then we can confirm both po litical and its negation given quaker.
Royal and African Elephants
This appears in [24, 5] . Horty et al and Sandewall disagree on this. We claim there are no "right" answers to this question and we build different graphs to model domains with different properties.
.4.
Naive diagnosis
Consider the diagnostic dual to the "birds fly" problem.
If we observe sneeze, a default reasoner produces all three diseases as diagnoses. The inference graph confirms both flu and w-flu; of these it is easy to prefer the most probable diagnosis confirmed by the observations. · If we observe -,sneeze only o-ftu is confirmed. 6 
Conclusions
We applied the formalism to many other default inference problems including plan recognition and stereotyping with positive results. In general, we obtain answers that agree with intuition. Where we haven't, the underlying sound probabilistic basis has al ways provided the tool for understanding the structure of the particular problem.
We have implemented the system in Pro log. A set of input probabilistic and log ical arcs are compiled into a graph that is used specifically for testing conditional independence using Pearl's definition of d separability [ll] . The rest of the system con-281 sists of a straightforward transcription of the Lemmas in Section 4 into Prolog and the sys tem prints a readable proof of the probabilis tic inferences it makes.
